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COMMENTS 
CONS1:ITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN INDIRECT 
CRIMINAL CONTEMPTS IN FEDERAL CouRTs-Should constitu-
tional provisions for jury trial apply to contempts committed 
outside the physical presence of a federal court? The United 
States Supreme Court, in the recent case of Green v. United 
States,1 reviewed this long disputed question. The case involved 
two Communist Party leaders who had been convicted of Smith 
Act violations and then had "jumped bail" when they disap-
peared in violation of surrender orders requiring their presence 
in court for sentencing. After four and a half years as fugitives 
they surrendered in 1956 and were charged with criminal con-
tempt of court. Following a so-called "summary" hearing (without 
the benefit of jury), they were found guilty and sentenced to 
three years in prison, to be added to their five-year sentences 
under the Smith Act. The majority sustained these convictions. 
But in a long dissent, Justice Black brought into focus several 
decades of criticism which has been leveled at summary proce-
dure in "indirect" criminal contempts (contempts which are 
committed outside the immediate vicinity of the court).2 
Against an imposing array of precedent sustaining summary 
procedure since the first Judiciary Act of 1789,3 Justice Black 
has gathered extensive authority to discredit such procedure. He 
l1as now gained support for his thesis, that such nonjury pro-
ceedings violate the Constitution, from Justice Douglas and 
Chief Justice Warren. Their argument appears to be that the 
burden of persuasion should be cast upon those who would cur-
tail the use of trial by jury, and that the historical basis of 
summary proceedings has been so undermined that any resultant 
doubt should be resolved in favor of jury trial.4 The inference 
is drawn that if the founders of the Constitution had squarely 
considered the problem of indirect criminal contempts, they 
would surely have desired to remove them from the power of 
a single judge. The present majority, in contrast, reason that 
1356 U.S. 165 (1958). 
2 It should be noted that Justice Black would prefer to overrule the use of summary 
procedure in any type of contempt, whether direct or indirect. See his dissenting opinion, 
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. I at 14 (1952). 
s Cases are collected in the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter, Green v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 165 at 191, n. 2 (1958). 
4 Id. at 207-208. 
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the weight of stare decisis creates a presumption in favor of 
summary procedure, and find the arguments adduced by Justice 
Black insufficient to overcome the precedents.5 Among the prob-
lems raised by the Green case are (1) whether the constitutional 
guarantee of jury trial should be judicially extended to cover 
criminal contempts committed outside the face of the court, 
and (2) what judicially imposed restrictions, if any, will the 
Court create on exercise of the contempt power. 
I. The "Historical Error" of Summary Procedure 
The status of proceedings against indirect contempts in Eng-
lish law at the time of the Constitutional Convention has never 
been fixed with any degree of certainty, although an extensive 
search into the relevant materials was accomplished by Sir John 
Fox.6 Fox offered the conclusion that at the time the Constitu-
tion was drafted, summary power to punish indirect contempts 
was not established in English practice, and that consequently 
the doctrine was neither part of the common law of the United 
States nor part of the "judicial power" that Congress was con-
stitutionally authorized to confer on the courts.7 Close examin-
ation of Fox's research, however, yields a more cautious con-
clusion: that by 1787 there probably was no valid basis for 
summary punishment of a libel on the court by a stranger to the 
proceedings; that summary punishment of resistance to a law-
ful writ or process of the court was doubtfully grounded; but 
that an adequate common law basis existed for summary punish-
ment of out-of-court contempts committed by an "officer" of the 
court.8 Fox's research started from the undelivered opinion of 
Justice Wilmot in The King v. Almon, a 1765 case involving 
a libel on Lord Chief Justice Mansfield by Almon, a bookseller.9 
The opinion, which declared that summary proceedings to punish 
such contempt were based upon "immemorial usage and prac-
tice," was not delivered since the prosecution was abandoned 
5 Id. at 184, 186-187. Cf. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion at 189-193. 
8 Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927); Fox, "The King v. Almon," 24 
L. Q. R.Ev. 184, 266 (1908); Fox, "The Summary Process to Punish Contempt," 25 L. Q. 
R.Ev. 238, 354 (1909); Fox, "The Writ of Attachment," 40 L. Q. R.Ev. 43 (1924). 
7 Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 205-207 (1927). 
s Id. at 98-99, 108-110; Fox, "The Summary Process to Punish Contempt," 25 L. Q. 
R.Ev. 238 at 244-245, 252 (1909). Justice Harlan's majority opinion in the Green case, 
356 U.S. 165 (1958), seems to point toward a similar conclusion, at 185, n. 18. 
9 WILMOT, NOTES 243 (1802). 
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because of a procedural mistake. The bulk of Fox's research was 
aimed at refuting this "immemorial usage" concept. Fox 
summed up the procedure to punish indirect contempts as 
having been unknown originally at common law, created by the 
Star Chamber, and later filtered into common law courts after 
abolition of the Star Chamber in 1641.10 It should be noted 
that counsel in Almon's Case proceeded on the assumption that 
summary procedure was regularly employed where there was 
resistance to the King's process; their arguments merely opposed 
extension of this procedure to out-of-court libels.11 Fox himself 
separates the contempts of disobedience to writ, and resistance 
or abuse of the process server, from the contempt of libelous 
abuse of the court, since his research discredited summary pro-
cedure in the last more convincingly than in the other two 
types of contempt.12 
II. Relation of Almon's Case to the Constitution 
Any defective common law basis of the doctrine in Almon' s 
Case would be immaterial if it were possible to define with cer-
tainty the intent of the constitutional framers with regard to the 
criminal contempt problem.18 It does not appear, however, that 
there was any discussion in the Convention or in any of the 
state ratifying conventions dealing with this issue.14 Apparently 
the Convention rejected establishment of jury trial in every 
case whatsoever.15 It is clear that jury trial was important to the 
colonials and that deprivation of jury trial was a principal 
10 Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 116-117 (1927). This is the part of Fox's 
research relied upon by Justice Black in bis dissent in Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 
165 at 205, n. 17 (1958). 
11 The King v. Almon, WILMOT, NOTES 243 at 253 (1802). 
12 Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 109-110 (1927). Note Fox's concessions 
as to earlier cases in Chancery, at 108-109, 117. Justice Harlan's rejection of the jury trial 
argument notes the limited purpose behind Fox's efforts. Green v. United States, 356 
U.S. 165 at 185, n. 18 (1958). 
13 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925), held: "The language of the Constitution 
cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to British in-
stitutions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted. The statesmen and 
lawyers of the Convention who submitted it to the ratification of the Conventions of the 
thirteen States, were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common law, and 
thought and spoke in its vocabulary." See also Fox, THE HISTORY OF CoNTEMPr OF COURT 
108-109 (1927). 
14 Justice ·Black's dissent, Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 at 207 (1958). 
15 THE FEDERALIST, No. 83, Ford. ed., 567 (1898) (Hamilton). Hamilton commented 
that "though trial by jury, with various limitations, is known in each State individually, 
yet in the United States, as such, it is at this time altogether unknown, because the 
present federal government has no judiciary power whatever." Id. at 563. 
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grievance against the King.16 But evaluation of the extent of 
"jury trial" as written into the Constitution invites a great 
deal of inference and guesswork. 
Unpublished until 1802 (when it was included in a post-
humous edition of Wilmot's Notes17) and not cited until 1811,18 
Almon's Case could hardly be said to have itself influenced the 
colonial lawyers. Its significance lies in the fact that it had been 
incorporated by Blackstone in his Commentaries, in which the 
author repeated Wilmot's theme that summary proceedings had 
derived from "immemorial usage."19 Blackstone was widely 
known to the colonials, so that even a misstatement by him 
would shed light on the possible intent of the Convention. 
Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Green indicates the belief 
that Blackstone's statement (or misstatement) of the law on this 
point expressed the "prevailing views in the American Colo-
nies. "20 Perhaps Justice Harlan's conclusion is too sweeping, since 
Blackstone also commented that summary procedure was "not 
agreeable to the genius of the Common Law in any other in-
stance."21 It is at least conceivable that this last phrase had an 
even greater influence on colonial lawyers than Blackstone's 
statement of the Almon doctrine. Moreover, the views of some 
of the other authorities available to the colonials should per-
haps be considered. For example, a widely-used law dictionary 
said that the summary nature of an "attachment" for contempt 
would be contrary to the jury trial provision in Magna Charta, 
and "must be for a contempt in the face of the court" or else 
for a contempt committed by officers of the court.22 Gilbert's 
History and Practice of Common Pleas, in its third (1779) edi-
tion, included a notation by the commentator that an English 
statute, which Gilbert had cited as confirming the power to 
commit for contempt after summary hearing, was properly meant 
to apply only to killing in resistance to process; the commentator 
added that Magna Charta's guarantee of jury trial would have 
been logically breached by any "Commitment for Contempt 
16 LEssER, HISTORY OF THE JURY SYSTEM 151 (1894). 
17 Note 9 supra. 
18 Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 5-6, 27 (1927). Almon's Case was first 
cited by counsel in Burdett v. Abbot, 14 East 1, 104 Eng. Rep. 501 (1811). 
19 4 BLACKST. CO!',IM., c. 20, §3. 
20 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 at 186 (1958). 
214 BLACKS!. COMM., c. 20, §2. 
22 JACOB'S LAW DicrIONARY, 9th ed. (1772) cited in Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF 
COURT 38 (1927). 
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merely ex officio."23 Conversely, nonjury procedure was sup-
ported by Hawkins' important work, Pleas of the Crown, in 
which the author noted that contempts both direct and indirect 
were punishable by attachment, which required the contemnor 
to present himself to the court, answer interrogatories concern-
ing his offense, and, unless he denied the charges (which purged 
him of contempt and left him to normal jury trial for perjury), 
be liable to judicial conviction.24 
The foregoing discussion of authorities available to the colo-
nial lawyers shows that some contemporary sources were at hand 
which could possibly have been interpreted to weigh against the 
use of summary procedure. But it is difficult to conclude with 
any conviction that such materials were so interpreted. A sur-
vey of the relevant decisions by colonial and state courts in the 
period between the writing and the publication of Wilmot's 
opinion in Almon's. Case, 1765 to 1802, is no more conclusive 
as an indication of the thinking of lawyers and judges of that 
period. In the year Almon's Case was argued, a Massachusetts 
chief justice entrusted a contempt by publication to the grand 
jury for indictment, but he explicitly informed them that the 
court had power to proceed summarily if it had so decided.25 
Thirty years later, the South Carolina court drew a distinction 
between direct and indirect contempts and prescribed jury trial 
in the latter type. 26 Some other cases allowed a summary pro-
cedure, but most of these involved direct contempts or con-
tempts by officers of the court, which were both historically pun-
ished by summary procedure.27 The cases of this period are so 
sparse and inconclusive that they furnish no adequate illumin-
ation of the constitutional scope of "jury trial." 
23 GILBERT, HISTORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMON PLEAS, 3d ed., 25, note (1779). The 
statute was Statute of Westminster the Second, chapter 39. 
24 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 5th ed., c. 22, §1, 141 ff. (1771). 
25 "The Charge of the Chief Justice to the Grand Jury," Quincy (Mass.) Rep. 241 
(1765). 
26 Lining v. Bentham, 2 Bay Rep. (S.C.) I at 8 (1796). 
27 See I REcoRDs OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT 87 (1933); State v. Stone, 3 H. &: 
McH. (Md.) 115 (1792) (attachment of contempt against justices of county court for refus-
ing to allow a certiorari issued by the court of appeals); Respublica v. Oswald, I Dall. 
(Pa.) 319 (1788) (contempt by libelous publication punished summarily, the court relying 
upon Blackstone's "immemorial usage"); Thwing v. Dennie, Quincy (Mass.) Rep. 338 
(1772) (snatching papers from the hand of the opposing counsel in court); Butterworth 
v. Stagg, 2 Johns. (N.Y.) 290 (1801) (person brought suit in name of another without his 
consent). In one libel case, defendant was summarily fined and imprisoned for contempt, 
but as a result the judges were impeached and a law passed to avoid repetition of such 
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Perhaps the language of the Judiciary Act of 1789, enacted by 
a Congress whose judiciary committee included members of the 
then recent Constitutional Convention, and who "no doubt 
shared the prevailing views in the American Colonies of Eng-
lish law," could be instructive.28 Justice Harlan, indeed, feels 
the act buttresses the validity of summary procedure. Some dif-
ficulties arise, however, from the wording of the act. It au-
thorized summary punishment of "all contempts in any cause or 
hearing before ... [the courts]."29 The more probable interpreta-
tion of this phrase would apply the preposition "before" as 
merely describing the "cause or hearing," and thus make the 
act applicable to all contempts. Yet it is arguable that a possible 
interpretation would apply this preposition to "contempts," and 
thus limit summary procedure to direct contempts. In the only 
Supreme Court decision affected by the 1789 act, habeas corpus 
was refused a witness whose contempt had been refusal to answer 
a question under oath, i.e., a direct contempt.30 In 1831, federal 
judge Peck construed the act to apply to a Ia-wyer who had 
published a criticism of an opinion while an appeal was pend-
ing, and thereby raised a furor that caused his own impeach-
ment by the Senate. A result of this famous impeachment, which 
ended in a one-vote acquittal, was revision of the Judiciary Act 
in 1831.31 The revised act recognized the validity of summary 
proceedings in both direct and indirect contempts, but sought 
to exclude remote newspaper criticism by limiting the contempt 
power to acts committed in the presence of the court "or so near 
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice."32 Neither the 
authors of this new legislation, nor the prosecutors of the im-
peached Judge Peck, disputed the fundamental validity of sum-
mary proceedings.33 
punishments. Respublica v. Passmore, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 441 (1802). But compare People v. 
Freer, Col. &: Cai. Cas. (N.Y.) 300 (1803). A later decision is Morris v. Creel, Brock. &: Hol. 
(Va.) 333 (1814) (clerk of the executive council of Virginia refused to obey subpoena). 
28 Justice Harlan in Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 at 186 (1958). 
20 1 Stat. 73, 83 (1789). 
so Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. (20 U.S.) 38 (1822). 
31 See Frankfurter and Landis, "Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal 
Contempts in 'Inferior' Federal Courts-A Study in the Separation of Powers," 37 HARv. 
L. REv. 1010 at 1024-1026 (1924), for a discussion of this incident. 
32 4 Stat. 487, 488 (1831). 
33 See Storrs' argument reported in STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. 
PECK 372-373, 380 (1883). This point noted by Justice Frankfurter in Green v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 165 at 190 (1958). 
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III. Development of Summary Procedure zn Indirect 
Contempts 
After the Judiciary Act of 1831, summary procedure be-
came firmly entrenched in a series of Supreme Court decisions 
rejecting jury trial starting with In re Savin in 1889.34 Although 
the Court took note as early as 1914 of the questionable common 
law background,35 the weight of stare decisis gradually mounted. 
At present, three principal strains are discernible in the law of 
indirect criminal contempts: (1) establishment and enforcement 
of minimal procedural standards, but not including jury trial; 
(2) gradual reduction of the area where the criminal contempt 
power can be exercised; (3) increasing severity in actual punish-
ments inflicted under the criminal contempt power. 
In 1925 the Court laid down basic requirements for judicial 
handling of an indirect contempt, including notice, hearing, 
right to counsel, right to present witnesses and to cross-examine 
others, and, when not impracticable, hearing of the contempt 
charge by a judge other than the one involved in the offense.36 
The Court demonstrated its willingness to enforce this last, 
discretionary, safeguard in 1954 when it overruled a conviction 
for a direct contempt on grounds that the judge had sufficient 
time to assign the trial to another more impartial arbiter.37 Al-
most all the constitutional guarantees save jury trial thus have 
been extended to the indirect contemnor. And when certain 
indirect contempts are also made crimes under state or federal 
statutes, the Clayton Act of 1914 furnishes the alleged contem-
nor with an optional jury trial.38 Although an attempt was 
made to attack this delimiting legislation as an unconstitutional 
abridgement of the "inherent" contempt power of the federal 
judiciary, the Court sustained the Clayton Act provision in 
1924.89 
84 131 U.S. 267 (1889). Cases are collected in Justice Harlan's opinion in Green v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 165 at 183, n. 14 (1958). 
85 Justice Holmes, writing for the court in Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 
at 610-611 (1914), noted the research of Solly-Flood, who had endeavored to show that 
summary procedure to punish any kind of criminal contempt was erroneously grounded. 
See SOLLY-FLOOD, THE STORY OF PRINCE HENRY OF MONMOUTH AND CmEF-JUSTICE GASCOIGN 
(1886). 
86 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925). 
37 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954). See Weisman, "Sacher and Isserman in 
the Courts: Note III," 15 LAW. GUlLD REv. 67 (1955). 
88 38 Stat. 730 at 739 (1914). 
39 Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924). 
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Lagging somewhat behind the establishment of procedural 
standards came gradual narrowing of the limits within which 
the contempt power can be exercised. This circumscription was 
foreshadowed by the uneasiness with which some justices had 
earlier regarded the contempt power.40 The trend was given its 
start in 1941 with the decision in Nye v. United States,41 when 
the phrase "so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of 
justice," which had previously been defined in terms of causal 
relationship, was redefined to mean the immediate geographic 
vicinity. In 1945 Justice Black ruled on behalf of the Court 
that perjury in and of itself did not qualify as a criminal con-
tempt, and added that criminal contempt should be always 
strictly construed.42 Judicial confinement of the power was most 
sharply etched in 1956 when a 7-2 majority led by Justice Black 
held that, contrary to the earlier accepted meaning, an attorney 
was not a court "officer" within the second clause of the Judiciary 
Act and therefore his misbehavior was not punishable sum-
marily.43 A coincident trend involved closer scrutiny by the 
Court of contempt proceedings within the states. The Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantee of due process was construed to require 
"imminent" rather than "likely" obstruction to justice in order 
to have actionable contempts,44 and minimal procedural guar-
antees were imposed.45 Echoing the Court's restraining attitude, 
lower federal courts have in scattered cases begun to show a 
tendency to curb their contempt powers.46 
<lO See dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 
247 U.S. 402 (1918). Cf. Opinion of Chief Justice Taft, in Cooke v. United States, 267 
U.S. 517 at 539 (1925), that exercise of contempt power "is a delicate one and care is 
needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions." 
41313 U.S. 33 (1941). 
42 In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945) . 
. 43 Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 {1956), interpreting 18 U.S.C. (1952) §401(2). 
The strained interpretation is analyzed in comment, 8 HAsT1NGs L.J. 56 (1956). 
44 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947). 
45 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), required public trial, reasonable opportunity to 
defend, notice, right to cross-examine, right to counsel, when immediate action was not 
necessary. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), added the requirement that the hearing 
be conducted by a different judge whenever possible. 
46 Lower federal courts have in some cases narrowed the definition of criminal con-
tempt, and some federal judges have even favored abolition of summary procedure in 
indirect contempts. Carlson v. United States, (1st Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 209 (erroneous 
but good-faith refusal of witness to answer question before grand jury not contempt); 
Matusow v. United States, (5th Cir. 1956) 229 F. (2d) 335 (defendant's execution of affidavit 
stating that he had falsely testified in prior prosecution not within contempt statute). In 
Farese v. United States, (1st Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 312 at 315, an incident occurring in 
corridors of the courthouse after proceedings had ended for the day was held not within 
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As the Court has increasingly restricted the sphere of appli-
cation of the contempt power and increasingly regulated the 
manner of its application, a gradual intensification of the severity 
with which contempts are punished has taken place.47 The most 
severe punishments have been inflicted in the past decade, when 
sentences up to four years have been approved by the Court.48 
In the Green case petitioners argued that courts were without 
power to sentence for more than one year for a conviction pro-
duced from summary proceedings. In rejecting this contention 
the Court said the severity of punishment was in the hands of 
the trial judge, absent any "abuse of discretion."49 
IV. Conclusion 
In perspective, the evidence of the colonial and Constitutional 
Convention attitudes toward jury trial in contempt proceedings 
is sketchy and inconclusive. Silence of the founders on the prob-
lem most logically means that they did not consider it; any 
other inference is pure conjecture. If the intent of the framers 
cannot accordingly be ascertained, what remains with which 
to resolve this controversy? Surely the long, consistent line of 
judicial precedent supporting and endorsing the use of summary 
proceedings in both direct and indirect criminal contempts can-
not be forgotten. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his con-
curring opinion in the Green case, "the fact that scholarship 
has shown that historical assumptions regarding the procedure for 
the statute. Magruder, C. J., stated: "It is the clear teaching of the Nye and Michael cases 
that the grant of summary contempt power, as contained in 18 U.S.C. §3401, is to be 
grudgingly construed, so that the instances where there is no right to a jury trial will be 
narrowly restricted to the bedrock cases where concession of this drastic power to the 
courts is necessary to enable them to preserve their authority and to insure the mainte-
nance of order and decorum in the proceedings before them." Judge Cameron of the 5th 
Circuit lb.as announced in favor of abolishing summary proceedings as unconstitutional 
in his partial concurrence in Ballantyne v. United States, (5th Cir. 1956) 237 F. (2d) 657 
at 666-670, a case which exempted from the statute defendant who failed to answer ques-
tions before a grand jury, with some indication of bad faith on his part. 
47 Examination of the twenty-five cases cited as providing the weight of precedent 
by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion, in Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 
(1958), reveals that, with two exceptions, fines and light jail sentences were imposed in 
every instance. Fines ranged from $5 in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), to $700,000 
assessed against ,the United Mine Workers in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 
U.S. 258 (1947). Jail terms varied upwards from 30 days in Brown v. Walker supra. 
48 United States v. Thompson, (2d Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 545, imposed a four-year 
sentence for bail-jumping by co-defendants of Green in the Smith Act prosecutions. 
49 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 at 188 (1958). 
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punishment of contempt of court were ill-founded, hardly wipes 
out a century and a half of the legislative and judicial history 
of federal law based on such assumptions."50 Moreover, the ex-
istence of summary power rests on more than precedent and 
custom; it is supported as well by reason. Even Chief Justice 
Taft, wary of the power, recognized as indispensable "the power 
of contempt which a judge must have and exercise in protecting 
the due and orderly administration of justice and in maintaining 
the authority and dignity of the court."51 Justice Holmes con-
ceded that when judicial functions were truly threatened he 
"would go as far as any man in favor of the sharpest and most 
summary enforcement of order in Court and obedience to 
decrees .... "52 To add the requirement of a slow and cumbersome 
jury trial could not but curtail the effectiveness of the court's 
sanctions and decrees. The need for. summary procedure, more-
over, is as strong in indirect contempts as it is in direct contempts. 
This would seem to be true despite historical distinctions un-
covered by Fox or theoretical distinctions suggested by the 
Clayton Act, which provides for optional jury trial only for 
indirect contempts. Proper judicial operation is impaired as 
much by persons fleeing or resisting court orders as by counsel 
trading invective with the judge in the courtroom. As has been 
shown in the previous discussion, the federal courts today exercise 
the criminal contempt power over only the most immediately 
damaging actions, and with almost all the procedural safeguards, 
save jury trial, spelled out in the Bill of Rights. 
If it is to be accepted, then, that summary proceedings are 
supported by stare decisis and are necessary to protect the court's 
function, still a further question may be asked: how much 
punishment is necessary for this protection? While the imposition 
of small fines and short jail terms might be approved as devices 
to deter would-be contemnors, sentences of ten or twenty years 
would certainly seem to exceed the amount of deterrent power 
needed. Within these extremes lies an area where the penalty 
imposed would depart from the minimum needed to implement 
judicial effectiveness and begin to encroach on the criminal 
law notion of meting out punishment. To the extent that un-
50 Id. at 189. 
51 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 at 539 (1925). 
52 Dissenting opinion in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 at 425 
(1918). 
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necessarily severe punishments are used, perhaps Justice Black 
is correct in contending that the contempt proceeding is essen-
tially criminal in nature, and therefore jury trial should be 
afforded.53 An incongruous feature of the Green case is that, 
after arguing that contempt is not a crime within traditional 
meanings or practical concepts, the majority used the five-year 
maximum sentence available under the criminal bail-jumping 
statute of 1954 as a yardstick to justify the three-year sentences 
imposed on the defendants.54 
At present, the punishment of contemnors lies in the com-
plete discretion of the trial court, subject to review only on the 
nebulous ground of an "abuse of discretion."55 Congress could 
greatly clarify this problem by establishing definite restrictions 
on contempt punishments · available to the courts. In 1957 it 
took an isolated step in this direction and regulated the severity 
of punishment available in indirect contempt proceedings under 
the new Civil Rights Act. A maximum penalty is fixed, and an 
option of jury trial is afforded a contemnor whose fine or sentence 
exceeds specified limits within the maximum.56 Similar, though 
more comprehensive, legislation should be enacted to cover all 
criminal contempts. 
Denis T. Rice, S.Ed. 
53 Justice Black argues the nature of criminal contempt as a crime rather than a sui 
generis proceeding in his dissent in the Green case, 356 U.S. 165 at 201-202. He relies 
strongly on the fact that criminal punishment is imposed, and feels that contempt thus 
"possesses all of the earmarks commonly attributed to a crime." 
54 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 at 189 (1958). The bail-jumping statute is 
18 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §3146. 
55 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 at 188 (1958). 
56 Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 634 at 638, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §1995. The 
maximum penalty under the statute is a $1000 fine and six months imprisonment. The 
option of jury trial is afforded the contemnor if the judge upon conviction levies a fine 
in excess of $300 or a jail sentence in excess of forty-five days. 
